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THE postwar market for state and. local government securities ac-
counted for approximately one-seventh to one-ninth of the gross
volume of- long-term funds (including real estate mortgages) raised
through the capital markets. If measured on a net basis—new is-
sues less retirement—the importance of this market was somewhat
greater: between one-fifth and one-eighth of the net flow of funds
into long-term uses. The relatively greater importance of net over
gross state and local government capital financing is accounted
for by the fact that the average maturity of state and local govern-
ment securities marketed has been fairly long and the amount of
refunding or repayment prior to maturity isless than in other
segments of the capital market.
The unique feature of the market for state and local govern-
ment securities, the one that sets it apart from other segments of
the capital market, is that interest income from these securities
is exempt from federal income taxes. The federal government
stopped granting this privilege to investors on its own securities
in 1941. Since then state and local governments have had a new-
issue monopoly of this privilege. The other characteristics that
influence this market, such as quality of securities and maturity
distribution of offerings, are also encountered in other sectors of
the capital market.
The exemption of state and local government securities from
the taxation of the federal government originated in the consti-
tutional division of sovereignty in the United States. Some con-
stitutional lawyers, including a number of specialized municipal
bond attorneys, feel that the doctrine of reciprocal immunity be-
tween the states and the federal government first stated in McCul-
loch v. Maryland in 1819 would make a federal tax on interest
income from state and local government obligations unconstitu-
tional. Many others, apparently including a majority Of academic
and federal government lawyers, feel that the passage of the 16th
Amendment removed this bar and that thereafter the federal gov-
ernment could have taxed the income from state and local gov-
ernment obligations. Since Congress explicitly exempted taxation
of such income by statute in 1913, that is where the matter has
since rested. In effect, the issue has not been adjudicated.
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The popular defense of tax exemption is that it helps state and
local governments finance meritorious capital expenditures: schools,
roads, sewers, waterworks, and the like. Thus tax exemption has
a powerful political appeal. At present. the possibility that the
exemption could be erased from the statute books seems remote.
But viewed as a problem in economics rather than politics, this
exemption seems to have become an increasingly ineffectual aid
to state and local government finance. A rational investor will
not accept a lower yield from a state and local government se-
curity unless it is offset by a more than equal tax savings. Since
this comparison must stand the scrutiny of the marginal investor,
intramarginal holders necessarily have tax savings considerably
greater than the reduction of borrowing costs to state and local
government. This margin may be viewed as a kind of "investors'
surplus."
Over the five years from 1951 to 1955, state and local govern-
ments saved on interest cost at a rate averaging less than three-
quarters of one per cent by virtue of tax exemption. During the
same period, the federal government lost annually on reduced
taxes an amount equal to about two per cent of the tax-exempt
bonds sold. The amount at issue would, at a rough guess, be a
sum in excess of half a billion dollars at present levels of interest
rates. This amount is suggested by multiplying the one per cent
differential by the outstanding debt of state and local govern-
ments which is now in excess of fifty billions of dollars. The rev-
enue foregone by the federal government as a result of this exemp-
tion can be viewed as a way of aiding state and local governments
to improve educational plants, build roads, and make other kinds
of state and local government capital outlays. This indirect sub-
sidy, however, has clearly become, a quite inefficient one. It has
helped state and local government finance only moderately but
has cost the federal government substantial 'amounts. Furthermore,
it has helped the most severely pressed local governmental Units
the least. This was particularly true in the case of lower-grade
obligations where the need of subsidy or help may be particularly
great. In other words, the toll roads, rapidly growing school dis-
tricts, and expanding municipalities apparently gained less from
tax exemption by way of reduced borrowing cost than the cities
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and states where borrowing needs were less pressing. The subsidy
element in tax exemption has not been correlated with need.
It has been suggested that in the absence of tax exemption
smaller local governmental units might have to pay a rate of in-
terest even higher than that paid by corporations of comparable
size and credit quality. (Corporate interest costs, fully subject to
income taxes, have been used for comparative purposes at several
points in this study.) This possibility exists and cannot be denied.
Nevertheless it does not seem likely. In the 1920's when tax exemp-
tion was worth far less than now, smaller local governmental units
apparently were able to borrow at rates below those applying to
comparable smaller corporations. Rates for both were high but
not excessively high for local government. Size probably affects the
credit quality of local government less adversely than it does the
credit quality of corporations. The logic of credit analysis sup-
ports this assumption.
The two principal causes for the reduced efficiency of tax exemp-
tion as a borrowing aid are: first, the demand for funds by state
and local governments increased enormously. Almost all borrowers
increased their demands on the capital markets but none have had
a more sustained impact than state and local governments. Second,
the number of investors combining tax exposure and a natural
investment interest in these obligations failed to expand equally
and very likely shrank relatively. As a result of these two factors,
yields on state and local government securities increased sharply,
relative to other yields as well as absolutely.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEMAND FOR FUNDS
During the postwar decade, 1946-1955, state and local govern-
mental units borrowed increasingly large amounts. In the early
postwar years, the backlog of deferred public construction was
large. In addition, these governmental units have been called on
to furnish a growing volume of services. Shifts in the housing
and location of population combined with sustained prosperity
have contributed to this situation. Still another factor was that
public construction costs increased faster than the general price
level. The high birth rate and rising incomes not only pushed
families into the suburbs; they also led to enlarged demands for
school and recreational facilities. The increased automotive popu-
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lation would have been even more crowded without added roads.
To allow traffic on the roads a chance to move meant off-street
parking facilities. And thus the chain of causation has run.
The immediate circumstance explaining most state and local
government borrowing in the postwar decade has been some kind
of governmental capital outlay. Borrowing, at least on a long-term
basis, to finance deficits in current expenditures over current re-
ceipts has been rare. States borrowed rather large amounts for
veterans' bonuses, but aside from this case noncapital financing
accounted for only a small fraction of the postwar total.
State and local government capital expenditures have not been
subject to any evident cyclical influence since World War II. They
appear to have been unaffected by any of the three modest dips
in business activity. This experience suggests that the basic demand
for the services of these facilities is not geared closely to short-term
income fluctuations. Furthermore, the planning and execution of
these works has such a massive momentum that it is not likely
to be disturbed by short-term business fluctuations. This has prob-
ably also been true in earlier periods, although during the Great
Depression state and local government capital expenditures were
drastically cut.
Indeed, it can be said that the borrowing by state and local
government to finance capital expenditures has recently had more
of a countercyclical than a cyclical character. State and local gov-
ernments, sensitive to the level of interest rates, tend to defer
financing in periods of tight money markets and to hasten to the
market when interest rates decline. Since financing is undertaken
well in advance of the actual capital expenditures, a prolonged
period of tight money markets would have to elapse before this
influence• succeeded in much dislocation of the time pattern of
state and local government capital expenditures. Ultimately, how-
ever, this influence seems to be felt.
Most state and local government capital expenditures are for
a type of facility that is not directly revenue-producing. Free roads
and school buildings and other public structures still dominate
state and local government capital expenditures. However, an in-
creasing proportion of the capital outlays of state and local gov-
ernments arefor revenue-producingfacilities:tollroads and
bridges, sewer and water systems, and sometimes such projects as
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Eerryboat systems, intra-urban transportation systems, public park-
ing facilities, and occasionally even facilities to attract new indus-
trial ventures to a locality. Projects of this sort are frequently
financed, not on the basis of the full faith and credit of the spon-
soring state and local governmental unit, but rather on the basis
of the revenue that these projects promise to produce. A later
portion of this summary will mention a few of the other factors
lying back of revenue bond financing. The influence of busi-
ness conditions on the ability of these facilities to produce revenue,
and therefore to service their bonds, is still largely untested.
SIZE OF THE MARKET: THE INVESTORS
Although the demand for funds has been formidable and in-
sistent, the number of investors interested in this market has not
kept pace. Only a limited number of institutional investors are
able to take full advantage of the privilege of tax exemption. Price
level fluctuations have convinced many individual investors that
purchasing power preservation is more important than preserva-
tion of fixed-dollar after-tax income.
The composition of investor participation in the market for
state and local government securities during the postwar decade
changed largely because of the shifting value of tax exemption to
various investors. Some investors are tax-exempt perSe: nonprofit
institutions, and qualified pension funds. Such investors obviously
have no reason to accept a lower yield for the privilege of tax
exemption. Life insurance companies are taxed according to a gross
investment income formula which gives them only modest use of
the privilege of tax exemption.1 Commercial banks and fire and
casualty insurance companies (both stock and mutual) are taxed
at the full corporate rate on net marginal investment income; tax
exemption is valuable to them and they are, as might be expected,
leading buyers of such securities. Individuals vary; income level,
1In1959, after this manuscript had been sent to the printer, Congress changed
the formula by which life insurance companies compute their federal income
tax liabilities. The new tax provisions, are so complex that their effects are still
being disputed by industry tax experts. The investment advantage of tax-exempt
securities under this new legislation appears to be particularly ambiguous. The
complexity of the law is so great that some industry representatives believe that
it may be changed again soon. Accordingly, no effort has been made to analyze
the new tax provisions for life insurance companies at this stage. Later references
to the income taxation of life insurance companies are, however, made obsolete
by this event.
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ownershipof equities or direct ownership of a business, access to
investment outlets such as oil royalties or rental real estate ac-
count for these basic differences. Some individual investors are
aggressive builders of wealth; tax-exempt securities hold little, ap-
peal for them since capital gains are likely to be their goal. The
rate of capital gain accrual they seek is likely to be quite a bit
in excess of prevailing yields on allfixed interest obligations
whether or not tax-exempt. Aggressive investors are also likely to
demand portfolio mobility. They shy away from many tax-exempt
obligations because of their limited marketability. Investors with
relatively high incomes who aim mainly at capital conservation
are the principal individual buyers of tax-exempt obligations. One
of the most significant bits of evidence of a declining interest of
individual investors in this market is the smaller proportion of
tax-exempt securities in large estates.
The changes in ownership of state and local government securi-
ties during the postwar period reflected each of these influences.
During the early years of the decade, life insurance companies
were active sellers of the state and local government obligations
they had accumulated when yields were higher and commercial
banks were avid buyers. Individuals were relatively neutral. Until
the closing year of the decade commercial banks were important
buyers of new issues; they were deterred only by interludes of
monetary tightness. Fire and casualty insurance companies bought
rather more common stocks than tax-exempt securities during the
early part of the decade; but in the later part, when equity prices
were quite high, they put more of their newly accruing funds into
tax-exempt securities. The shift from equities to tax exempts also
appears to have been true of personal trusts administered by cor-
porate fiduciaries. Individuals bought tax-exempt securities directly
whenever the yields on them approached fully taxed yields but
withdrew from the market when the margin widened. The direct
market to individuals seemed to show viability primarily when tax-
exempt yields were close to the yields on comparable fully taxed
securities.
Investors have been broadly logical in their treatment of the
privilege of tax exemption. But in their treatment of risk they have
by no means been so clearly rational. The market seems to require
high premiums to assume even moderate degrees of credit risk.
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While the credit of some state and local government units is not
beyond reproach, the general quality of such credit is high. "In-
termediate-grade" Baa or A securities are of respectable quality.
They simply do not have the wide margin above reasonable stand-
ards possessed by very high-grade securities.
Presumably this emphasis on quality reflects the character of the
investors who buy tax exempts. They are not the aggressive and
capital-gains maximizing type; they are conservative and cautious.
This is true of the institutions that invest in this market as well
as of the individuals who use it. As a result, intermediate or lower-
grade tax-exempt securities are less benefited by tax exemption
than the high-grade ones. Endowing the financing of toll roads,
bridges, tunnels, ferries, and other revenue-producing projects with
the privilege of tax exemption has thus proved to be a rather
barren subsidy; many investors have gained rather materially from
the privilege, but these projects have not retained a respectable
proportion of this amount by virtue of their ability to offer this
privilege to the market. The most impressive demonstration of this
fact is that quite a few toll-road bonds have been bought by life
insurance companies which are subject to a 61/2percent marginal
rate of taxation on income.
THE MARKETING OF NEW STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ISSUES
The marketing of new-issue state and local government securities
cuts across both the capital and money markets. The marketing
institutions include investment banking institutions and a number
of commercial banks. These institutions are organized to compete
in public bidding to acquire these issues and to resell them to
investors. Many high-grade state and local governments raise capi-
tal at a marketing cost of less than 1 per cent; most of them achieve
a cost of less than 1½ per cent. Only in periods of capital market
tension do marketing costs go much higher. Lower-grade and longer-
term oblIgations meet somewhat higher costs, anywhere from 2 to
3 per cent. Only rarely does one encounter a cost for marketing
capital issues in excess of 4 per cent, and then generally for marginal
projects based on revenue financing.
The marketing institutions Constitute a refined and sensitive
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system. The underwriters do not seem to discriminate against gov-
ernmental units in any clearly irrational way. In fact it can be
said that the market is remarkably adaptive to the many com-
plexities of state and local government finance; that the marketing
institutions, in most cases, tend to have a constructive influence
on the financial policies of governmental units; at the same time
they help to educate and persuade investors to accept the peculiar
and the unusual types of securities that grow out of the exigencies
of such finance.
We could find no evidence that these marketing institutions
were other than neutral with respect to the pricing process—with
one possible exception. That exception grows out of the inventory
practices of dealers. By the nature of this market dealers are forced
to take net long positions. Short positions are rare and dangerous.
Because dealers' inventories may be a source of loss to the invest-
ment banking community, the short-term price record of this mar-
ket is often erratic. This factor may also help to explain the fre-
quent and wide price fluctuation of state and local government
securities.
Nothing found indicated that the existing organization of the
marketing institutions has an enduring influence on the level of
tax-exempt yields. The ultimates of price and yield determination
are clearly a combination of the demands for funds, of investor
supply of them, and of Federal Reserve policy. The dealer com-
munity sometimes seems to have a mild low-rate bias: dealers bid
actively, and are happier when yields are declining because they
gain more than they lose from movement in this direction. But
this is mostly sentiment; there is no evidence that they have enough
ultimate economic power to give much effect to such an influence.
The personnel of this market are thoroughly sophisticated and
aware of the several elements of irrationality mentioned at various
stages of this study. But, being realists, they accept the existence
of these irrational factors and allow for them. They bid for new
issues on the basis of what they believe investors will pay for them.
If investors will pay more for the bonds of a midwestern city that
is an ipfrequent borrower than for PHA contract Housing Author-
ity bonds supported by a federal government contract to service
the debt, investment bankers reflect this preference in their bid-
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ding actions, even though they believe such an investor judgment
to be partly irrational.
THE SECONDARY MARKET IN TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES
The degree of marketability of state and local government ob-
ligations is disputed. Defenders of this market claim that these
obligations are reasonably marketable, but critics of it do not agree.
Evidence is hard to marshal, but the facts collected in this study
suggest that the time required to market any appreciable volume
of these securities is considerable (unless the owner is willing to
cut prices drastically) and that the marketing cost in the secondary
market is higher than in the new issues market.
The principal quantitative conclusion reached with respect to
the secondary market is that it apparently parallels closely the new
issues market as respects yields but moves conversely as respects
volume. Unlike corporate securities, the obligations of state and
local governments do not go through a "seasoning" process. The
only systematic comparison of new-issue and secondary market
yields possible is one based on a very short time series of new-issue
yields prepared by the Investment Bankers Association. No clear
difference in yiel4 between securities offered in the new issues
market and those offered in the secondary market could be detected
in this short-term comparison. Revenue obligations based on proj-
ects under construction and for which there is no operating experi-
ence are an exception to this rule. Bin such revenue obligations,
as we shall find, are more like corporate obligations than like full-
faith-and-credit obligations of states and local governments.
When the new issues market is dormant, the secondary market
takes on life and vitality. Investors seek to meet their portfolio
needs in this market and dealers actively seek offerings. When the
supply of new issues is ample, the secondary market tends to be-
come less active.
The one great exception to this rule was the development of tax
"swaps" near the end of the postwar decade. The tax rules apply-
ing to commercial banks permit them to deduct the security losses
from current income in computing tax liability. On the other hand,
they continue to have the privilege of treating capital gains on a
preferred tax basis. As a result, commercial banks engage in exten-
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sive tax "swaps," booking losses in tax years of declining prices
on the securities they sell.
PRICING THE PRIVILEGE OF TAXEXEMPTION
When in 1941 the federal government elected to make the in-
come from its own obligations taxable, it left tax exemption to
be exploited by state and local governments. With a monopoly
of this privilege for subsequent new issues, the yields on state and
local government obligations were driven down to a very low level
in the postwar period. In 1946 the computed yield on 20-year Aaa
state bonds went to 0.9 per cent; the Blue List of that period
showed offerings of 30- to 40-year obligations at1 per cent yields
and even less. By the fall of 1957, the yield on a comparable obli-
gation was about three and one-half times as high.
In retrospect, 1946 yields were at an absurdly low level. They
were only about two-fifths of the yields on fully taxable high-grade
obligations; the other three-fifths was the premium paid for tax
exemption. If this premium seems high in retrospect, it might have
seemed even higher in prospect. In the 1920's and 1930's when
securities of the federal government generally offered partial tax
exemption (and in some cases complete tax exemption), the value
of the privilege was generally modest. Even though tax rates in
1946 were well above the levels of the 1920's and 1930's, many
were confidently expecting tax reductions. In other words, the
high premium paid for tax exemption at the beginning of the
postwar decade should not be viewed as normal, but rather as a
special circumstance that happened to prevail at the time our
formal analysis begins.
As the postwar decade advanced, the fear of a shortage of tax-
exempt obligations diminished and finally vanished. The premium
on such obligations accordingly shrank. This was not a steady
trend; it came in spurts and was reversed at least once. In 1948
when a tax cut was being debated at length in Congress, the pre-
mium shrank; tax-exempt securities declined in price more than
other securities. Their recovery in 1949 was parallel only to that
of taxable obligations (and possibly less than that). In late 1950
the fear of taxes induced by the involvement in Korea brought
about a reversal and the prices of tax-exempt obligations moved
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contrary to other security prices. But this was a short-lived move;
it was reversed in early 1951.
Starting in 1951 and reaching a climax in 1953, the money
markets experienced their first real tightness in two decades. The
prices of tax-exempt securities dropped greatly. But the significant
fact was that they dropped more than those of fully taxable obli-
gations of about the same credit quality. This experience sug-
gested that state and local government security yields were un-
usually sensitive to Federal Reserve credit policy.
This impression was deepened in 1954 when, in money markets
made easy by Federal Reserve policy, the prices of state and local
government securities recovered somewhat more than those of tax-
able obligations. In 1955, 1956, and early 1957, when money mar-
ket conditions tightened, the prices of state and local government
obligations again went down more than those of comparable tax-
able securities.
In a technical market sense, this sensitiveness of state and local
government obligations might be explained largely by commercial
bank investment policy. Commercial banks bought tax-exempt se-
curities actively when loan demand was modest but reduced their
purchases (or even sold) when loan demand became urgent. While
this fact may be a plausible explanation of the greater short-term
sensitivity of the state and local government security market, the
more fundamental reason seems to be that the proportion of in-
vestors having rational tax reasons for being interested in this
market has remained constant or even declined while the demand
for funds has been broadening. State and local governments have
had to bargain away an increasing proportion of the advantage
of tax exemption to investors.
The yield differential between high-quality state and local gov-
ernment securities and those of intermediate quality continued to
be relatively wide. They ended the decade just about as far apart
as when it started. On the other hand, the differential between
grades of corporate obligations narrowed. It can be argued that
the absolute credit quality of "intermediate" corporations improved
considerably during this decade. But in many ways the same thing
could be said of local governmental units. The shifts of population
and the demands for public services strained the finances of many
governmental units. At the same time the fundamental economic
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situation of many of these governmental units probably improved.
It is hard to support the view that corporate credit has improved
so much more than state and local government credit as indicated
by the changes in these yield differentials.
The more convincing explanation seems to be that the principal
investors in state and local government obligations tend to be tem-
peramentally conservative. Risk-takers find little in this market to
attract them. Thus the differential between the highest grade se-
curities and those of intermediate grades is not a reflection of a
rational judgment of risk, but an expression of investor preference.
The price for finding risk-bearers for investment in tax-exempt
obligations appears to be much higher than any actuarial valua-
tion that might be put on the risk.
Offering scales on tax-exempt obligations are a measure, of a
sort, of maturity-yield interest rate differentials. They might be
thought of as yield curves. The evidence collected in this study
showed that the shape of the maturity-yield functions for state
and local government serial offerings often varied from the shape
of the similar function for U.S. Treasury obligations or other fully
taxable securities.
Neither the shape of these curves nor their variations from the
more conventional yield curves seemed to square with the principal
interest rate hypotheses. Liquidity preference certainly could not
explain it since the spread between early and intermediate matu-
rity tax-exempt obligations has often exceeded that of U.S. Treas-
ury obligations, whereas the liquidity preference hypothesis would
lead one to expect the opposite relationship. The forecasting hy-
potheses as an explanation of maturity-yield relationships also fails
to square with observed differences. Past differentials have been
poor harbingers of later yield changes. The most reasonable ex-
planation, a purely institutional rather than theoretical one, is that
this market is highly segmented. Investors have strongly held ma-
turity preferences. The relative participation of various investor
groups fluctuates and seems more often than not to furnish the
most reasonable explanation of shifts in the maturity-yield rela-
tionship.
The prices of state and local governmental obligations have been
somewhat more variable than those of other securities, both in
frequency of price changes and in the range of price movements.
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This volatility apparently has been due to the fact that state and
local government obligations are influenced both by changes in
the general levels of interest rates and by the changing yield
discount of the privilege of tax exemption. Compounding two fac-
tors of variability (which sometimes coincide and sometimes do
not) makes them more volatile than istrue of those securities
which are influenced by just one of these factors.
Estimates of the reduction in cost of borrowing by state and
local government compared with the loss of revenue by t.he fed-
eral government suggested that soon after World War II most of
the advantage of reduced borrowing costs was being retained by
state and local government borrowers while investors obtained rel-
atively little advantage from the purchase of tax-exempt securities.
The amount of new-issue borrowing was small in this period and
most of the advantage of low yields accrued to investors who sold
out their holdings in the secondary market. Life insurance com-
panies were important sellers at this juncture. As the decade wore
on, however, the reduction in the cost of borrowing grew rela-
tively smaller when compared with the loss of revenue by the
federal government. This was particularly true during years of
heavy state and local government borrowing. Although the esti-
mation of both these magnitudes isnecessarily crude, it seems
quite clear that the revenue lost by the federal government was
two to three times the reduction of borrowing costs. The differen-
tial between revenue lost and borrowing cost reduction was par-
ticularly great in the case of lower-grade obligations. The problem,
therefore, was that those state and local government units most
in need of good borrowing terms were least able to make full use
of the privilege of tax exemption.
Although the differential widened over the decade and therefore
suggests a trend, this is probably an unwarranted conclusion. Prior
to World War II state and local government obligations did not
have a monopoly on tax exemption so the experience then cannot
be used to lengthen our historical perspective. On the other hand,
it seems quite safe to conclude that in periods of heavy borrowing
most of the advantage of tax exemption must be passed along to
investors and relatively little of it can be retained by state and
local governments. In other words, an average of the annual fig-
ures weighted by the volume of financing in• each year is consid-
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erably below a simple average of the annual figures. In fairness,
it should be made clear that the erosion of the benefits of tax
exemption may have been partly due to the fact that changes in
tax law during the decade opened up other means by which in-
vestors could minimize tax liability.
While tax exemption can be viewed as a boon to state and
local governments, itis not an unmixed advantage. Because so
many investors have no logical reason for investing in tax-exempt
securities, the market is necessarily smaller than for fully taxed
obligations, and, furthermore, itis more erratic. The relatively
small savings in borrowing costs netted by state and local govern-
ments must be offset against the fact that they must finance in a
more confined and less stable market.
Those who feel that tax exemption is an important factor in
reducing state and local government borrowing costs may be giving
too little weight to the intrinsically high quality of these credits.
While there have occasionally been defaults on these obligations,
most of them were cured without great delay. Ultimate losses on
these obligations have been small and rare. State and local govern-
ment credit would deserve a high credit standing apart from tax
exemption and would deserve relatively low interest rates.
THE MARKET FOR REVENUE OBLIGATIONS
Citizens, acting through their state and local governments, ap-
parently believe that some governmental activities should be self-
financing and self-supporting. Revenue financing is an expression
of this belief. The special authorities established by states to oper-
ate harbors, bridges, toll roads, and the like exemplify such cir-
cumstances. The market for revenue obligations is much more like
the corporate bond market than that for obli-
gations of state and local governments. First, a much larger propor-
tion of them are in term rather than serial form. Second, a larger
proportion of them are handled as negotiated deals rather than
by public competitive bidding. Third, investors usually judge the
quality of a security by its ability to earn income.
Revenue financing has also been used to escape the debt limits
imbedded in state constitutions and financing statutes. When the
political obstacles to the removal of debt limits are great, revenue
obligations have been used in circumstances where full-faith and
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general credit obligations would ordinarily be appropriate. One
state has a constitutional debt limit which has, in effect, required
it to do all of its borrowing in revenue form. School districts
and other special-purpose districts have sometimes been unable to
borrow and so have had to arrange complex lease contracts or other
devices so as to establish the financial foundation on which a
revenue financing project could be undertaken. Whenever financing
is supported only by a pledge of revenue, it costs more than it
would if based on a pledge of full-faith and general credit. This
penalty is often material.
Although all commercial banks may purchase revenue state and
local government obligations, members of the Federal Reserve can-
not participate in the underwriting of them. For this and other
reasons they frequently do not take an active interest in this mar-
ket even as investors. Commercial banks which are members of
the Federal Reserve System have recently been seeking legislation
to permit them to underwrite revenue obligations.
Revenue bonds have attracted somewhat different investors than
those that buy full-faith and general credit obligations. Although
individuals constitute the larger part of the market for these secu-
rities, there is a general feeling that it is a different group of indi-
viduals from the one that purchases full-faith and general credit
obligations. The revenue bonds used to finance toll roads and other
quasi-speculative ventures have unquestionably attracted individ-
uals of somewhat more aggressive character than those that typi-
cally buy full-faith and general credit tax-exempt obligations.
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